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INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-five years after the implementation of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (“the WTO Agreement”),1 international trade 
law and practice under the multilateral trading system 
(MTS) of the WTO are undergoing a fundamental transition. 
The “development deficits” in WTO legal disciplines, which 
necessitated the Doha Round, have not been bridged for over 
two decades.2 The Doha Round, which was launched in 2001 
to promote development agenda, became the longest 
peacetime multilateral negotiation without successful 
conclusion.3 The proliferation of regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) has created regulatory fragmentation and weakened 
the MTS based on the principle of non-discrimination (the 
“most favored nation” or the “MFN” principle).4 Recent trade 
restrictive measures, such as the tariffs adopted by the 
United States under the pretext of protecting national 
security, have set a new pattern of trade protectionism.5 
This transition marks a new era for the world trading 
system post neoliberalism. WTO legal disciplines (or “WTO 
disciplines”) embody neoliberalism6 in their objectives and 
 
 1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. This agreement 
settled the multilateral legal frameworks for international trade. 
 2. See Yong-Shik Lee, Reclaiming Development in the World Trading 
System 270–71 (2d ed. 2016). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 190 [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
 5. See Yong-Shik Lee, Three Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: The Conundrum 
of the U.S. Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, 18 WORLD TRADE REV. 481 (2019) 
(discussing the U.S. tariffs). 
 6. Neoliberalism is a dominant political-economic ideology that emerged in 
the 1980s, which discouraged positive government interventions in the economy 
and promoted free market approaches, including privatization and trade 
liberalization. Neoliberalism is based on the “Washington Consensus,” which 
refers to a set of policies representing the lowest common denominator of policy 
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substantive provisions.7 The Uruguay Round (1986–1994), 
which was the last trade negotiation round of the GATT (the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) that established 
the WTO, adopted neoliberal policy prescriptions and aimed 
to achieve trade liberalization across the board and the 
expansion of the MTS.8 The reinforced WTO disciplines, such 
as the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(“the Subsidies Agreement” or “the SCM Agreement”),9 the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (“the 
TRIMs Agreement”),10 and the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism, have weakened state control and influence over 
trade, pursuant to the neoliberal stance. At the same time, 
the old GATT provisions that enabled governments to adopt 
trade-related measures to meet public interest, such as the 
promotion of economic development11 (under Article XVIII), 
 
advice being advanced by Washington-based institutions, such as fiscal 
discipline, a redirection of public expenditure priorities toward areas offering 
both high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution 
(such as primary healthcare, primary education, and infrastructure), tax reform 
to lower marginal rates and broadening the tax base, interest rate liberalization, 
a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inflows of 
foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry 
and exit), and protection of property rights. John Williamson, What Washington 
Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN READJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS 
HAPPENED 5, 7–20 (John Williamson ed., 1989). 
 7. See WTO Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl. The government failures to 
make economic adjustments in the 1970s during the periods of the oil shock and 
the fall of the Soviet bloc and its socialist economy in the 1980s renewed the 
public confidence in the market and caused the policy shift toward neoliberalism. 
See supra note 6 (explaining the neoliberal policy prescriptions). 
 8. For a discussion of the negotiation history, see generally THE GATT 
URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986–1992) (Terence P. Stewart ed., 
1993). 
 9. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
 10. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 
1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter TRIMS Agreement]. 
 11. Economic development refers to the process of progressive transformation 
of an economy leading to higher productivity and increases in income for the 
majority of populations. 
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were neither elaborated nor reinforced by subsequent 
agreement in WTO disciplines.12 
The support and confidence in neoliberalism has waned 
since the 1990s, shortly after the establishment of the WTO. 
The neoliberal policies in Eastern Europe (in the post-Soviet 
era), Latin America, Asia, and Africa failed to deliver the 
promised economic outcomes, leading to hyperinflation, 
massive unemployment, and a long period of economic 
recession.13 Critics have cited institutional weaknesses and 
lack of proper moderation and policy sequencing as a cause 
of the failure.14 Opponents of the neoliberal policy have also 
criticized trade liberalization under the new trade regime of 
the WTO for having concentrated economic benefits in small 
privileged groups, failing to lift the living standards for the 
majority of populations in developing countries.15 The 
reinforced WTO disciplines have also deprived the state of its 
ability to adopt key trade measures to promote economic 
development, such as trade-related subsidies and tariff 
measures, which were adopted by the successful developing 
countries as listed below.16 
 
 12. In contrast, the fourteen separate agreements under the WTO Agreement 
reinforce and elaborate the GATT provisions in other areas such as rules 
regulating trade-related subsidies (the SCM Agreement). For a further 
discussion, see LEE, supra note 2, at 271. 
 13. David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in 
Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in 
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1, 6 (David M. 
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (citing the failures of the neoliberal policies); 
see also YONG-SHIK LEE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 21–22 
(2019). 
 14. Trubek & Santos, supra note 13, at 6. 
 15. Id.; see also A. G. Hopkins, The New Economic History of Africa, 50 J. 
AFRICAN HISTORY 155 (2009). The dichotomy between developed and developing 
countries is not always clear, but the former are normally understood as high-
income countries with advanced economic, technological, and industrial 
capacities. In the WTO, the developing country status is self-declared without 
clear definitions or guidelines by the WTO. See Who are the developing countries 
in the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/ 
d1who_e.htm [https://perma.cc/SG9N-YKTG]. 
 16. LEE, supra note 2, at 14–32. 
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The successful developing countries in the 1960s through 
the 1990s, such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
more recently China, adopted strong government-led 
development policies. These included trade-related subsidies 
such as export subsidies (i.e., subsidies contingent upon 
export) and import-substitution subsidies (i.e., subsidies 
contingent upon the use of domestic products), as well as 
tariff measures, which would not be permitted under the 
current WTO disciplines.17 Like the East Asian countries, 
developed countries in the West such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom also employed extensive subsidies 
and tariff measures during the periods of their own 
development, which would have been inconsistent with the 
WTO disciplines today.18 The neoliberal policy requirements 
adopted under the WTO law have substantially reduced the 
policy space and increased regulatory barriers to the 
countries that attempt to adopt trade-related measures, as 
the successful developing countries did in the past, for the 
purpose of economic development.19 
Ironically, a major challenge to the MTS under the 
auspices of the WTO has recently been raised by its very 
architect, the United States of America. The United States 
was the founding member of the GATT and a major force 
behind the establishment of the WTO.20 Until recently, the 
 
 17. Id; see also Mari Pangestu, Industrial Policy and Developing Countries, in 
DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK 153, Table 17.1 (Bernard 
Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo, & Philip English eds., 2002) (discussing the evolution 
of industrial policies of the successful developing countries). 
 18. Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in 
Historical Perspective 13–68 (2002). 
 19. Dani Rodrik commented that the current trade rules have made “a 
significant dent in the abilities of developing countries to employ intelligently-
designed industrial policies.” Dani Rodrik, Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First 
Century 34–35 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov., Harvard U., Faculty Research 
Working Papers, RWP04–047, 2004), https://www.sss.ias.edu/files/pdfs/Rodrik/ 
Research/industrial-policy-twenty-first-century.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6UE-
9SZP]. 
 20. Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, The World Trade Organization (WTO): U.S. 
Participation at Risk?, CRS INSIGHT (July 18, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ 
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United States had initiated and promoted international 
negotiations for further trade liberalization, such as the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement.21 The Trump 
administration made a radical policy shift toward trade 
protectionism, evidenced by withdrawing from the TPP 
Agreement and demanding renegotiation of the North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and amendment of 
the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement on threat of their 
terminations. It also imposed substantial tariffs on imports 
from China22 in hundreds of product categories and invoked 
national security to impose tariffs on its steel and aluminum 
imports globally, excepting only a small group of countries 
with which it concluded quota agreements.23 This U.S policy 
departs substantially from its own traditional trade practice 
favoring multilateralism and open engagement. 
The radical policy shift, which has important 
ramifications for the MTS requires further consideration. 
The election of Donald Trump, a controversial businessman 
and a political outsider, as the forty-fifth U.S. president was 
an unexpected outcome.24 His support base included 
economically-depressed regions in the United States25 that 
 
IN10945.pdf [https://perma.cc/CSG5-QJFQ]. 
 21. Yong-Shik Lee, Future of Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Just a 
Dead Trade Initiative or a Meaningful Model for the North-South Economic and 
Trade Integration?, 51 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 1–2 (2017). 
 22. See Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China’s Acts, Policies, 
and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and 
Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 47,974, 47,975 (Sep. 21, 2018). 
 23. These countries include South Korea, Brazil, and Argentina. For a further 
discussion, see Yong-Shik Lee, The Steel and Aluminum Quota Agreements: A 
Question of Compatibility with WTO Disciplines and Their Impact on the World 
Trading System, 53 J. WORLD TRADE 811 (2019). 
 24. See John Slides, A Comprehensive Average of Election Forecasts Points to 
a Decisive Clinton Victory, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/08/a-comprehensive-average-of-election 
-forecasts-points-to-a-decisive-clinton-victory/ [https://perma.cc/LEH8-LYHB]; 
see also Yong-Shik Lee, Law and Economic Development in the United States: 
Toward a New Paradigm, 68 CATHOLIC UNIV. L. REV. 229, 230 (2019). 
 25. For example, President Trump won the majority vote in a number of 
states that make up the Great Lakes megaregion, commonly referred to as “Rust 
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did not perceive benefits from the trade liberalization policy 
that the United States had pursued under the previous 
administrations. The multinational enterprises based in the 
East and the West coasts of the United States, new leading 
industries, such as pharmaceuticals and IT, and 
international investors and traders may have reaped the 
benefits from the policy, but the residents in the areas with 
the declining industries losing out from the competition with 
imports have supported the trade protectionism advocated 
by Trump.26 The elements of neoliberalism in the WTO 
system, which caused the “development deficits” in WTO 
disciplines, ironically provoked the trade protectionism from 
the largest and the most powerful economy, even if the 
protectionist trade policy of the Trump administration is 
unlikely to revive the declining U.S. industries and generate 
more employment and income for his supporters.27 
This Article, which examines international trade law 
and practice post neoliberalism, is organized as follows. Part 
I discusses the development deficits of the WTO system, 
examines the challenges from developing countries through 
coalitions and alliances, and analyzes the current impasse of 
the Doha Round. Part II examines the proliferation of 
bilateralism and regionalism in international trade, which 
creates preferential/discriminatory trade arrangements, 
causes the fragmentation of trade disciplines, and weakens 
the MTS. Part III discusses the trade protectionism of the 
 
Belt.” This area encompasses the upper Midwest states, stretching from northern 
Minnesota to western New York and Pennsylvania. The term signifies the 
economic decline, deindustrialization, population loss, and urban decay caused 
by the decline of its once-prosperous manufacturing sector. This region has lost 
more than 1.2 million manufacturing jobs since 1990 and 2.2 million since 1970. 
Robert D. Yaro, Toward a National Reinvestment Strategy for Underperforming 
Regions, in AMERICA 2050: NEW STRATEGIES FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 13 (Petra Todorovich & Yoav Hagler eds., 2009). 
 26. See Trip Gabriel, How Erie Went Red: The Economy Sank, and Trump 
Rose, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2016. 
 27. It is because the primary cause of the declining U.S. industries is the 
failure of industrial adjustment through innovation, re-education, and training, 
rather than trade. See Lee, supra note 24, at 230–31. 
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United States under the Trump administration, as 
demonstrated by its recent trade measures adopted under 
the pretext of the national security protection. Trade 
protectionism of the most powerful economy and trader 
affects the stability of the MTS and undermines its viability. 
Part IV suggests possible regulatory reforms to address some 
of the identified problems in the current trade disciplines. 
Part V draws conclusions. 
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I. CHALLENGES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
A. Development Deficits 
1. An Unbalanced Deal 
The Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations aimed at 
increasing market access. Efforts to increase market access 
had continued throughout the preceding GATT regime, and 
tariffs have been systematically reduced since its beginning 
in 1947. Several multilateral trade negotiations had been 
convened for the purpose of tariff reductions, and as a result 
the average tariff rates of industrial countries on industrial 
products dropped from around 44 percent28 in the beginning 
of the GATT era to 3.9 percent at the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round.29 In this process, developing countries made 
considerable import concessions, particularly during the UR. 
For instance, India offered an average tariff reduction of 6.16 
percent, while it only received an average reduction of 1.22 
percent for its exports.30 Similarly, Thailand offered 5.93 
percent and received only 1.46 percent on average.31 These 
concessions by developing countries were significant, 
although developing countries had imposed higher tariff 
rates than developed countries. 
In contrast, developed countries did not offer comparable 
concessions in market access, particularly in the product 
 
 28. There is an argument that the pre-GATT average tariff rates were lower, 
at around 22 percent. Chad P. Bown & Douglas A. Irwin, The GATT’s Starting 
Point: Tariff Levels Circa 1947 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 21782, 2015). 
 29. There were eight multilateral trade negotiations (“rounds”) during the 
GATT era (1947–1994). The first round (the “Doha Round”) in the WTO regime 
began in November 2001. During the previous GATT rounds, tariffs were reduced 
by an average of 35 percent at each round. As a result, the tariff rates of non-
primary products of industrial countries fell to a mere 3.9 percent after the 
Uruguay Round in 1994. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 74 (2d 
ed. 1997). 
 30. J. Michael Finger & A. Alan Winters, Reciprocity in the WTO, in 
DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 57 T. 7.3. 
 31. Id. 
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areas in which developing countries would have a relative 
advantage in exports such as agriculture and textile.32 In 
agriculture, trade was not fully liberalized. Measures that 
were not allowed for trade in industrial products, such as 
export subsidies, were maintained albeit subject to certain 
reduction commitments.33 In textiles and clothing trade, 
extensive import restrictions, such as restrictive quotas and 
high tariffs, had been prevalent, as represented by the 
Multifiber Arrangement (MFA).34 The Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was settled during the UR, but 
it was an interim agreement which maintained the status 
quo.35 It took ten additional years before textile and clothing 
trading was fully integrated with the MTS without trade 
restrictions such as the MFA.36  
On the whole, the UR resulted in an unbalanced deal 
between developed and developing countries. The UR 
achieved a substantial degree of trade liberalization for trade 
in industrial projects for which developed countries enjoy a 
competitive advantage. However, trade liberalization was 
limited in product areas such as agricultural products, 
textile, and clothing, in which developing countries would 
have a competitive advantage, as discussed above. The new 
rules such as the SCM Agreement created difficulty for 
developing countries to promote industrial development. The 
SCM Agreement restricted policy space for developing 
countries by preventing them from adopting certain trade-
related subsidies to promote domestic industries and 
economic development, such as export subsidies and import-
 
 32. LEE, supra note 2, at 141–42. 
 33. Agreement on Agriculture arts. 8–9, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410. The 
Agreement also stipulates domestic support reduction commitments, as 
expressed in “Total Aggregated Measurement of Support” (AMS). Id. art. 6. 
 34. LEE, supra note 2, at 143. 
 35. Id. at 144. 
 36. Id. 
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substitution subsidies.37 Successful developing countries had 
adopted these subsidies successfully for their own economic 
development.38 The UR also concluded preferential rules for 
developing countries, often referred to as “special and 
differential treatment” or “S&D treatment,” but they were 
inadequate to balance the outcome as further discussed 
below. 
2. Inadequate “Special and Differential” Treatment 
WTO legal disciplines include preferential provisions for 
developing countries granting S&D treatment. These 
provisions aim to: (i) increase the trade opportunities of 
developing countries, (ii) require WTO Members 
(“Members”) to safeguard the interests of developing 
countries, (iii) allow some flexibility to developing countries 
with respect to commitments and use of policy instruments, 
(iv) provide additional transitional time-periods to 
implement commitments, and (v) offer technical assistance.39 
According to a WTO report, 139 S&D provisions are 
scattered throughout the WTO disciplines.40  
However, these S&D provisions are inadequate to meet 
the development interests of developing countries. The S&D 
provisions disregard significant differences existing among 
developing countries in economic and trade capacities and 
treat them without a distinction, with the sole exception of 
least-developed countries. The S&D provisions are 
temporary in nature,41 insufficient in the extent of 
 
 37. SCM Agreement, supra note 9, art. 3. Annex I of the SCM Agreement 
includes the illustrative list of prohibited export subsidies. Id. Annex I. 
 38. LEE, supra note 2, at 14–32. 
 39. WTO Secretariat, Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO 
Agreements and Decisions, WTO Doc. WT/COMTD/W/196 (June 14, 2013). 
 40. Id. 
 41. For example, developing countries (those other than least-developed 
countries) were permitted to apply export subsidies for a period of eight years 
from the implementation date of the WTO Agreement. SCM Agreement, supra 
note 9, art. 27, para. 2(a). 
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preference,42 or impose regulatory impediment on developing 
countries seeking to benefit from the S&D treatment. The 
regulatory impediment necessitates further examination. 
For an example, Article XVIII of the GATT,43 entitled 
“Government Assistance to Economic Development,” is a 
primary GATT provision offering development facilitation. 
Article XVIII enables developing-country Members, whose 
economies can only support low standards of living and are 
in the early stages of development,44 “to maintain sufficient 
flexibility in their tariff structure [e.g., may increase tariff 
rates] to be able to grant the tariff protection required for the 
establishment of a particular industry and to apply 
quantitative restrictions for balance of payment purposes in 
a manner which takes full account of the continued high level 
of demand for imports likely to be generated by their 
programmes of economic development.”45 
Article XVIII is designed to assist developing-country 
Members in implementing programs and policies of economic 
development to raise the standard of living for their 
populations. It does so by authorizing measures affecting 
imports, such as raising tariffs beyond their multilateral 
 
 42. For example, safeguard measures, emergency import restraint measures 
adopted under the Agreement on Safeguards, must not be applied against a 
product originating in a developing country Member as long as its share of 
imports of the product concerned in the importing Member does not exceed 3 
percent, provided that those developing country Members with less than 3 
percent import share collectively account for not more than 9 percent of total 
imports of the product concerned. Agreement on Safeguards art. 9.1, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter SA]. The 3 and 9 percent ceilings are criticized 
for being too restrictive. YONG-SHIK LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE 
174 n.31 (3d ed. 2014). 
 43. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XVIII, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. The provisions of the 1947 GATT 
are incorporated by reference in the GATT 1994. They are incorporated as a part 
of the WTO legal disciplines as a result of the UR. See GATT 1994, supra note 4 
(incorporating the GATT in the WTO legal disciplines). 
 44. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XVIII, para. 4(a). 
 45. Id. art. XVIII, para. 2 (explanation and emphasis added). 
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commitments under the WTO disciplines.46 However, the 
Article also requires the Member proposing to adopt the 
measure to conduct negotiations with the other Members to 
be affected by the measures and offer adequate 
compensation, lack of which will entitle the affected 
Members to withdraw or modify their own trade 
concessions.47 Such negotiation may take a considerable 
amount of time. In addition, developing countries facing 
resource constraints may not be able to offer adequate 
compensation. These requirements render Article XVIII 
measures costly and risky from the perspective of developing 
countries in need of the measures.48 The UR did not remedy 
the insufficient Article XVIII provisions by, for example, 
creating a more effective agreement, as it did in a number of 
other areas,49 that would be more feasible for developing 
countries to invoke without the burden of time-consuming 





 46. See LEE, supra note 2, at 72–77. 
 47. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XVIII, para. 7. 
 48. See LEE, supra note 2, at 273. As a result, relatively few Article XVIII 
measures were adopted. From 1947 to 1994, Section A of Article XVIII (which 
provides for measures other than for balance-of-payment reasons) was invoked 
only nine times: by Benelux on behalf of Suriname (1958), Greece (1956, 1965), 
Indonesia (1983), Korea (1958), and Sri Lanka, twice in 1955 and once each in 
1956 and 1957, and has not been invoked since the establishment of the WTO. 
WORLD TRADE ORG., ANALYTICAL INDEX OF THE GATT 501 (1995) [hereinafter 
ANALYTICAL INDEX]. 
 49. For example, Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
and Agreement on Safeguards were concluded to enable Members to adopt 
measures to protect intellectual property rights and safeguard measures, 
formerly applied under GATT Article XX and XIX, respectively, more effectively 
under clearer conditions. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement]; SA, supra note 42. 
 50. See LEE, supra note 2, at 271. 
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3. Harmful Trade Remedy Measures 
WTO disciplines authorize trade remedy measures or 
“administered protection,” such as anti-dumping measures, 
countervailing measures, and safeguard measures. Anti-
dumping measures are applied in the form of increased 
tariffs when imports are “dumped,” i.e., sold at prices below 
normal value.51 Countervailing measures, also in the form of 
increased tariffs, are applied against imports where the 
government of the exporting country provided either 
“prohibited subsidies” or other “actionable subsidies.”52 
Safeguard measures are applied in the form of increased 
tariffs or quantitative restrictions (quotas) against imports 
where an increase in imports causes serious injury to a 
domestic industry or threat thereof.53 
Among administrative protections, anti-dumping 
measures and countervailing measures are particularly 
adverse to the development interests of developing countries. 
Anti-dumping measures are the most prevalent trade 
remedy measures. As of June 2018, 1,854 anti-dumping 
measures were in force.54 Developing countries are 
particularly vulnerable to anti-dumping measures, because 
they tend to rely on low-cost labor and price competitiveness 
for their exports, and anti-dumping measures tend to target 
low-priced products exported from developing countries.55 
 
 51. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. 1, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter “Anti-
Dumping Practice Agreement” or “ADP Agreement”]. The “normal value” is 
determined by comparison to the home price or, where a proper comparison 
cannot be made due to the market situation or a low sales volume in the domestic 
market, to an export price in a third country. Id. arts. 1–2. 
 52. These categories include export subsidies, import-substitution subsidies, 
or any other subsidies that adversely affect the trade of other Members. SCM 
Agreement, supra note 9, arts. 7–9. 
 53. SA, supra note 42, art. 2, para. 1. 
 54. World Trade Organization, Report (2018) of the Committee on Anti-
Dumping Practices, Annex C, WTO Doc. G/L/1270, G/ADP/25 (Oct. 29, 2018). 
 55. See LEE, supra note 2, at 124. 
428 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
Anti-dumping measures are premised on the presumption 
that there is somehow a “normal price” that can be 
determined by the investigating authorities, rather than by 
the market. Yale economist T. N. Srinivasan characterized 
anti-dumping as the equivalent of a “nuclear weapon in the 
armory of trade policy” and suggested removing it in the 1999 
WTO high-level symposium on Trade and Development.56 
Countervailing measures are also adverse to the 
development interests of developing countries. As mentioned 
earlier, the successful developing countries in East Asia and 
in the West adopted subsidies to promote domestic 
industries.57 This policy tool is no longer authorized under 
WTO disciplines where it affects trade. Countervailing 
measures are applicable against prohibited subsidies such as 
export subsidies, import-substitution subsidies, and 
otherwise actionable subsidies.58 Exports are an import 
vehicle to promote economic development where domestic 
markets are small. Government subsidies contingent upon 
exports (export subsidies) can contribute to export expansion 
as demonstrated by the successful development cases in East 
Asia.59 Likewise, subsidies contingent upon the use of 
domestic products (import-substitution subsidies) can also 
contribute to industrial development in the early stages of 
economic development, even if liberal market economists 
tend to object to the use of both types of subsidies as 
economically inefficient.60 Regardless of the debate, the 
policy choice—currently limited by the SCM Agreement—
should be available to developing countries under qualifying 
 
 56. WTO, Report on the WTO High-Level Symposium on Trade and 
Development (Mar. 17–18, 1999), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/ 
summhl_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2XE-P6RE]. 
 57. See CHANG, supra note 18, at 50 (for a discussion of the adoption of 
subsidies for the purpose of economic development). 
 58. SCM Agreement, supra note 9, arts. 7–9. 
 59. See CHANG, supra note 18, at 46–51; LEE, supra note 2, at 98. 
 60. LEE, supra note 2, at 19–32.   
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conditions,61 in consideration of its important role for 
economic development that is also recognized by the SCM 
Agreement.62 
B. Coalitions of Developing Countries 
1. Developing Countries in Coalitions 
The development deficits inherent in the WTO, as 
discussed in the preceding Section, brewed discontent among 
developing countries. They felt that the outcome of the UR 
was unbalanced and did not serve their interests 
adequately.63 In contrast to this development, some 
developed countries encouraged by the outcome of the UR 
pushed for the inclusion of additional developed-country 
agendas, such as labor standards and environmental 
conditions.64 This push was met with strong objections by 
developing countries.65 The WTO’s pursuit of global 
harmonization of an extensive range of national rules caused 
considerable strain among Members and clashes with local 
interests seeking policy autonomy.66 Discontent and tension 
grew significantly by the late 1990s, contributing to the 
failure of the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999 and the 
Cancún Ministerial in 2003.67 
 
 61. See discussion of the Tariff-Facilitating Subsidy infra Section IV.A. 
 62. SCM Agreement, supra note 9, art. 27, para. 1 (“Members recognize that 
subsidies may play an important role in economic development programmes of 
developing country Members.”). 
 63. LEE, supra note 2, at 282; see also Declaration by the Group of 77 and 
China on the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha, Qatar (Oct. 22, 2001), 
https://www.g77.org/doc/Doha.htm [https://perma.cc/3DZ2-MZS3]. 
 64. John S. Odell, The Seattle Impasse and Its Implications for the World 
Trade Organization, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: 
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 400, 403 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James 
D. Southwick eds., 2002). 
 65. Id. at 400–03. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See also Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 219, 219 (2004). 
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Developing countries formed the numerical majority in 
the WTO, and they found a means to challenge major 
developed-country Members by forming alliances and 
coalitions.68 Efforts to form developing country coalitions 
(the “South-South coalitions”) against the hegemonic 
developed countries to safeguard their economic and political 
interests had begun since the historic Bandung Asian-
African Conference in 1955.69 The Group of 77, formed within 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) in June 1964, became the most important 
structure for the South–South coalition and promoted 
reforms in the GATT.70 The coalition was not active during 
the UR but revived through the establishment of the South 
Center in 1994 and the subsequent Havana Meeting in 
2000.71 
The Group of 77 was a loose organization, and it did not 
represent the only coalition among developing countries. 
Developing countries through multiple alliances and 
coalitions demanded changes necessary to restore a balance 
in WTO disciplines and reduce the development deficits. For 
example, twenty developing countries led by Brazil, India, 
and China (which later became the G21) formulated a 
common position on negotiations and submitted a joint 
 
 68. See Faizel Ismail, One Year Since the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference: Developing Countries Re-claim the Development Content of the 
WTO Doha Round, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH WORLD TRADE: A 
DEVELOPING WORLD PERSPECTIVE 121, 139 (Yong-Shik Lee ed., 2008); An Chen, A 
Reflection on the South–South Coalition in the Last Half-Century from the 
Perspective of International Economic Law-Making, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
THROUGH WORLD TRADE: A DEVELOPING WORLD PERSPECTIVE, supra, at 33, 35. 
 69. Chen, supra note 68, at 35–36. 
 70. Id. at 36–37. From 1964 to 1968, the Group of 77 strongly advocated and 
instituted reformative guidelines and jurisprudential principles, inter alia, on 
generalized preferential and non-reciprocal treatment favorable to the 
developing countries and promoting the partial reform of the GATT legal system. 
Additionally, the Group of 77 was instrumental to adopting both the U.N. 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and 
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States in 1974. Id. 
 71. Id. at 38–39. 
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proposal on global trade reform to the WTO72 days before the 
convening of the Cancún Ministerial Conference. The 
proposal included increasing market access for agricultural 
products and reducing agricultural subsidies.73 By the turn 
of the century, the challenges from developing countries 
formed a key dynamic in WTO negotiations, which meant 
that no progress in the MTS would be possible unless their 
development interests were accommodated. 
2. Prospects of the South-South Coalitions 
In addition to the Group of 77, various other coalitions 
and alliances emerged over the course of WTO negotiations, 
such as the G21; the alliance among CARICOM, the OAU 
and the least-developed countries (LDCs); and the G33.74 As 
discussed in the following Section, the stalemate in the Doha 
Round continued for well over a decade without an end in 
sight. Developing countries in alliances and coalitions may 
have been successful in tabling their development agenda for 
the MTS but have not yet been so successful in reforming the 
WTO to meet their development interests. Factors such as 
the large economic and political gaps existing among 
developing countries, the divergent and at times conflicting 
interests among developing countries on specific 
development issues (e.g. the agricultural issues), and the 
influence of the North and their strategies have imposed a 
degree of limitations on the South-South coalitions. 
Developing countries comprise three-quarters of the 
WTO membership. They are a large group of extremely 
divergent countries in economic capacities, trade interests, 
cultural and political backgrounds. For example, China, 
which is still considered a developing country in terms of its 
 
 72. World Trade Organization, Agriculture – Framework Proposal, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(03)/W/6 (Sept. 4, 2003). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Chen, supra note 68, at 43 n.23. 
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per capita income,75 is the second largest economy in the 
world and the largest exporter, with significant political 
influence. Other “giant” developing countries such as India 
and Brazil are also very different in economic and trade 
capacities and political influence from most other developing 
countries. This extreme divergence is not conducive to 
maintaining strong and united coalitions over time, despite 
the claimed solidarity among the members. Conflicts among 
developing countries also reduce confidence and allegiance in 
the South-South coalitions. Large developing countries, such 
as China, may criticize the hegemonic attitude of the Global 
North, but they have also exerted their own powers and 
hegemony in their sphere of influence. This is demonstrated 
by China’s trade retaliation against its smaller trade 
partners, including South Korea, Vietnam, and the 
Philippines, over geopolitical issues such as the deployment 
of a missile defense system that it found objectionable.76 
Additionally, developing countries have not shared 
common interests on some key trade issues, such as 
agricultural issues. Some developing countries have strong 
export interests, but some do not. Consequently, they have 
shown different attitudes toward the proposed agricultural 
reform in the WTO.77 The powerful North exerted their 
influence on members of the coalitions. Its strategy, 
including the bilateral approach made by the United States 
to negotiate and conclude bilateral and regional trade 
agreements with individual developing countries,78 has 
 
 75. China’s per capita GNI (gross national income) was US $9,460 in 2018, 
below the world average of US $11,124 in the same year. GNI per capita, Atlas 
method (current US$), WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
NY.GNP.PCAP.CD [https://perma.cc/6H8G-2KU2]. 
 76. For a relevant discussion, see Yong-Shik Lee, Should China be Granted 
Market Economy Status?: In View of Recent Development, 3 CHINA & WTO REV. 
319, 327–35 (2017). 
 77. For example, the majority of the Group of 77 did not join the 2003 
Framework Proposal. See Agriculture – Framework Proposal, supra note 72. 
 78. See Ian F. Ferguson, Cong. Research Serv., RL32060, World Trade 
Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda 2, 8 (2006); Joseph 
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weakened the coalitions. The South-South coalitions are 
expected to continue, but the emergence of a strong, united 
coalition that represents the majority of developing countries 
is unlikely to appear in the near future. Rather, coalitions 
are more likely to remain as loose groups, and smaller ones 
such as the G21 will act to advance the common interests of 
a limited number of developing countries. Regardless of the 
coalitions, large developing countries such as China, India, 
and Brazil will continue to play a key role in the MTS on its 
own economic capacity and political influence, advancing 
their own agenda that at times could meet the interests of 
other developing countries as well as their own. 
C. The Doha Round and Its Impasse 
Th
1. The Launch of the Doha Round 
e WTO’s first trade negotiation round, “the Doha 
Round,” was launched in 2001 in Doha, Qatar at the fourth 
Ministerial Conference.79 The focus of the Doha Round was 
the improvement of the conditions of trade for developing 
countries, as demonstrated by the establishment of a work 
program entitled the “Doha Development Agenda (DDA).”80 
The Doha Round (or “the Doha Development Round” for its 
emphasis on the development issues) arose out of the 
challenges from developing countries against the 
development deficits in the WTO. The shift in negotiating 
powers in favor of developing countries since the failed 1999 
Seattle Ministerial meant that it was necessary to address 
 
Stiglitz, Arrested Development, The Guardian (Aug. 10, 2006), http://www.thegua 
rdian.com/commentisfree/2006/aug/10/post290 [https://perma.cc/Q3D5-HPJK]. 
 79. For relevant documents on the Doha Round, see World Trade 
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. See also WORLD 
TRADE ORG., THE DOHA ROUND TEXTS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (2009) 
[hereinafter DOHA TEXTS]. 
 80. Doha Declaration, supra note 79, para. 2; DOHA TEXTS, supra note 79, at 
5. 
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development issues for the MTS to progress in the new WTO 
system.81 
The Doha Round included a long list of ambitious 
objectives: implementation, agriculture, services, market 
access (non-agriculture), intellectual property, investment, 
competition, transparency in government procurement, 
trade facilitation, anti-dumping, subsidies, regional 
agreements, dispute settlement, environment, e-commerce, 
small economies, debt and finance, trade and technology 
transfer, technical cooperation, least-developed countries, 
and special and differential treatment.82 Members were 
expected to maintain the single undertaking and accept the 
entire package on the outcome of the negotiations, 83 which 
later proved to cause substantial delays in the conclusion of 
the Doha Round. 
Of the number of subjects to be negotiated, agriculture 
was the most important. The agriculture section in the DDA 
included “substantial improvements in market access; 
reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export 
subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting 
domestic support,” while maintaining special and 
differential treatment for developing countries.84 Under the 
terms of the Agreement on Agriculture, work for the 
negotiation had already been underway.85 The DDA, 
however, did not include deeper regulatory reform that 
would re-balance the WTO disciplines to meet the 
development interests of developing countries, such as 
reformation of the subsidies regime to allow export and 
import-substitution subsidies for qualified developing 
countries,86 adjustment of the binding tariff concessions (i.e., 
 
 81. LEE, supra note 2, at 282–83. 
 82. Doha Declaration, supra note 79. 
 83. Id. para. 47. 
 84. Id. para 13. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See discussion on the DFS infra Section IV.A. 
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clarification and reinforcement of Article XVIII measures),87 
and substantial adjustment of anti-dumping measures 
toward its removal.88 
2. The Long and Winding Road: A Long Impasse 
The Doha Round was originally scheduled to conclude by 
January 2005.89 However, the failure of the first post-Doha 
Ministerial (the 2003 Cancún Ministerial) due to 
disagreements over agricultural issues and a standstill over 
a group of other issues (“Singapore Issues”)90 signaled its 
treacherous path. The Singapore issues included four 
subjects: trade and investment, competition policy, 
transparency in government procurement, and trade 
facilitation.91 Members agreed at the 1996 Singapore 
Ministerial Conference to establish working groups for 
further investigation.92 The DDA initially included these 
developed-country issues, but lack of consensus on the part 
of developing countries caused the removal of three of them 
from further negotiation.93 Accordingly, Members agreed to 
proceed only on the subject of trade facilitation, 94 which led 
to the conclusion of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation 
later in the process. 
Members failed to meet the negotiation deadlines 
repeatedly which had to be extended each time. Further, 
 
 87. See discussion on the DFT infra Section IV.A. 
 88. Id. For a reform proposal, see discussion infra Section IV.A. See also LEE, 
supra note 2, at 290–98. 
 89. Doha Declaration, supra note 79, para. 45. 
 90. See Robert Baldwin, Failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference at 
Cancún: Reasons and Remedies, 29 WORLD ECON. 677, 689 (2006) (discussing the 
causes of the failure). 
 91. Id. 
 92. World Trade Organization, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(96)/DEC, paras. 20-22 (1996). 
 93. World Trade Organization, Decision Adopted by the General Council, 
para. 1(g), WTO Doc. WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
 94. Id. 
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Members could not agree on the three key issues (“the 
triangle of issues”): agricultural domestic support, 
agricultural market access, and non-agricultural market 
access (NAMA).95 Director-General of the WTO at the time, 
Pascal Lamy, described the impasse: “the gap in level of 
ambition between market access and domestic support 
remained too wide to bridge. This blockage was such that the 
discussion did not even move on to the third leg of the 
triangle—market access in NAMA.”96 The strong political 
interests associated with agricultural domestic support in 
the United States and the EU limited their options and 
created a substantial difficulty in making any breakthrough 
on these issues.97 A number of Members also diverted their 
attention and resources to bilateral and regional trade deals, 
which further weakened focus on the Doha negotiations.98 
Despite the impasse, visible outcomes were produced in 
the 2013 Bali Ministerial and the subsequent 2015 Nairobi 
Ministerial in the form of Ministerial Decisions. These 
include the Agreement on Trade Facilitation,99 facilitating 
food security in developing countries,100 special safeguard 
mechanism for developing countries,101 cotton trade 
(prohibiting export subsidies and calling for a further 
 
 95. Chairman’s Introductory Remarks, Informal TNC meeting at the level of 
Head of Delegation, WORLD TRADE ORG. (July 27, 2006), https://www.wto.org/ 
english/news_e/news06_e/tnc_dg_stat_28march06_e.htm [https://perma.cc/BLP5 
-422D]. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Daniella Markheim & Brian Riedl, Farm Subsidies, Free Trade, and 
the Doha Round, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Feb. 5, 2007), https://www.heritage 
.org/budget-and-spending/report/farm-subsidies-free-trade-and-the-doha-round 
[https://perma.cc/DR94-V56M]. 
 98. LEE, supra note 2, at 286. 
 99. World Trade Organization, Agreement on Trade Facilitation – Ministerial 
Decision of 7 December 2013, WT/MIN(13)/36, WT/L/911 (2013). 
 100. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015, 
WT/MIN(15)/44, WT/L/979 (2015). 
 101. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015, 
WT/MIN(15)/43, WT/L/978 (2015). 
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reduction in domestic support and improvements to market 
access for LDCs),102 preferential rules of origin for LDCs,103 
and extension of trade preference for LDC trade in 
services.104 Most importantly, a decision was issued to 
eliminate all export subsidies in agriculture.105 Under this 
Decision, developed-country Members were required to 
eliminate their remaining scheduled export subsidy 
entitlements as of the date of adoption of the Decision, while 
developing-country Members were required to eliminate 
such entitlements by the end of 2018.106  
The 2015 Nairobi Ministerial did not formally declare 
the end of the Doha Round, but Members disagreed on the 
continuation of negotiation on the Doha mandate.107 For the 
latter reason, some called the Doha Round effectively 
ended.108 Members, however, remained committed to 
continuing negotiations on the remaining Doha issues.109 
Regardless of the formal announcement, the momentum to 
revive the Doha Round seems to have been lost, and as shown 
by the outcome of the subsequent Buenos Aires Ministerial 
 
 102. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015, 
WT/MIN(15)/46, WT/L/981 (2015). 
 103. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015, 
WT/MIN(15)/47, WT/L/917/Add.1 (2015). 
 104. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015, 
WT/MIN(15)/48, WT/L/982 (2015). 
 105. World Trade Organization, Export Competition – Ministerial Decision of 
19 December 2015, WT/MIN(15)/45, WT/L/980 (2015) [hereinafter Export 
Competition Declaration]. 
 106. Id. paras. 6–7. 
 107. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 19 December, 2015, 
WT/MIN(15)/DEC (2015). 
 108. The Editorial Board, Global Trade After the Failure of the Doha Round, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/opinion/global-
trade-after-the-failure-of-the-doha-round.html [https://perma.cc/WF4Q-Y2EP]; 
The FT View, The Doha round finally dies a merciful death, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/9cb1ab9e-a7e2-11e5-955c-1e1d6de 
94879 [https://perma.cc/Y7KT-TJTA]. 
 109. Export Competition Declaration, supra note 105, para. 1. 
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without a reference to the DDA.110 The WTO’s inability to 
conclude its first negotiation round might be viewed as its 
failure, but the outcome reflects the changing dynamics in 
the international trading system post neoliberalism. 
Developing countries, through various coalitions, were able 
to put forward a difficult development agenda, such as 
politically sensitive agricultural subsidy issues. They did not 
prevail over the disagreements of the United States and the 
EU, resulting in the impasse. However, this stalemate 
suggested that the challenges developing countries mounted 
were effective, resulting in partial successes such as the 
elimination of agricultural export subsidies.111 The process 
confirmed that the United States and the EU no longer 
controlled rule-making in the MTS and could no longer 
impose the one-size-fits-all, neoliberal approach that had 
prevailed during the UR.112  
  
 
 110. See Eleventh WTO Ministerial Conference, WORLD TRADE ORG., https:// 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc11_e/mc11_e.htm [https://perma.cc/D
8ER-TYVG]. 
 111. Export Competition Declaration, supra note 105, para. 6. 
 112. The FT View, supra note 108 (suggesting that “[a] better approach would 
be plurilateral pacts among a group of governments, expanding to more countries 
after their creation and eventually being multilateralised under WTO rules”). 
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II. PROLIFERATION OF BILATERALISM AND REGIONALISM 
A. “Exception” Becomes the Rule 
The proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs), 
including bilateral trade agreements, which aim to remove 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade among the signatories 
to the RTAs, is a salient feature of the international trading 
system post neoliberalism. As of January 2020, 303 RTAs 
were in force, which correspond to 483 notifications from 
Members, counting goods, services and accessions 
separately.113 This is a radical increase from 39 RTAs in force 
when the UR was completed in 1994.114 The European 
Economic Area (EEA), the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, 
and the Southern Common Market (MECOSUR) are some of 
the largest RTAs in force. Since RTAs provide preferential 
market access exclusively to their members, they are 
considered an exception to the general rule in the MTS based 
on the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle.  
The MFN requirement is stipulated in GATT Article I. 
The Article provides in relevant part: 
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on 
or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the 
international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with 
respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with 
respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation 
and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in 
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege 
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product 
 
 113. Regional trade agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm#facts [https://perma.cc/2SWC-GSGS]; 
see also Rafael Leal-Arcas, Proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements: 
Complementing or Supplanting Multilateralism?, 11 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 597 
(2011) (commenting on the proliferation of RTAs); Gonzalo Villalta Puig and 
Omiunu Ohiocheoya, Regional Trade Agreements and the Neo-Colonialism of the 
United States of America and the European Union: A Review of the Principle of 
Competitive Imperialism, 32 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 225 (2011). 
 114. Regional Trade Agreeements Database, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://rtais. 
wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx [https://perma.cc/QA67-RTZS]. 
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originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in 
or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.115 
The MFN requirement prohibits discriminatory 
treatment according to the origin of a product, and it is a key 
legal requirement essential to sustain the MTS. Thus, 
preferential treatment under RTAs is an important 
departure from this principle.  
The GATT nevertheless authorized the formation of 
RTAs under qualifying circumstances to accommodate the 
then-existing preferential trade arrangements among the 
founding members.116 The number of RTAs remained 
relatively small throughout the GATT regime (1948–1994), 
as illustrated in the following figure.117 RTAs started to 
increase substantially since the establishment of the WTO: 
the number was 39 in 1994, increased to 83 in 2000, and to 
214 in 2010.118 
  
 
 115. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. I, para. 1. 
 116. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XXIV. 
 117. See Regional Trade Agreements Database, supra note 114. The number 
was under five in the 60s and increased to 9 in 1973 and to 23 in 1986. 
 118. Id. 





Figure 1: RTAs in Force (1948–2019)119 
  
 
 119. Id. 
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As discussed in the preceding Section, the long impasse 
in the Doha Round has driven Members to focus on RTAs 
outside the WTO, bilaterally or with a group of other 
Members sharing stronger trade interests and closer 
economic, regional, and political ties.120 As a result, nearly 
every Member is a part of one or more RTAs,121 operating 
both in the MTS under the auspices of the WTO and in one 
or more preferential RTA regimes. RTAs cover more than 
half of international trade and comprise the international 
trading system alongside the MTS,122 thereby becoming a 
rule, rather than an exception. The next two Sections discuss 
the legal requirements for the formation of RTAs and the 
issues arising from their proliferation. 
B. Formation of Regional Trade Agreements 
1. Regulatory Control 
GATT Article XXIV and Article V of the General 
Agreement on Services (GATS)123 regulate RTAs for trade in 
goods and services, respectively. The 1979 Decision on 
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity 
and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (“the 
Enabling Clause”)124 also regulates preferential trade 
agreements made among developing countries. The WTO 
 
 120. For a list of RTAs in force, see RTAs in force, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx [https://perma.cc/L9B5-4V9U]. 
 121. Id. According to the WTO RTA map, all Members but Mauritania joined 
one or more RTAs as of March 2020. Participation in Regional Trade Agreements, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/rta_participa 
tion_map_e.htm [https://perma.cc/48VX-DG5M]. 
 122. Regional trade agreements are evolving – why does it matter?, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/regional-trade-agreements [https://perma.cc/BP 
46-RKVN]. 
 123. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
183 [hereinafter GATS]. 
 124. Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries, Decision of 28 November 1979, L/4903 
(Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D., at 203 (1980) [hereinafter GATT 1979]. 
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receives notifications, considers individual RTAs, and 
monitors their operation through the Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements (CRTA), established within the WTO 
General Council for Trade.125 The CRTA has a mandate to 
hold discussions on the systemic implications of the 
agreements for the MTS.126 
GATT Article XXIV authorizes formation of RTAs in the 
form of a free trade area and a customs union.127 The Article 
provides: 
[T]he provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between 
the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs 
union or of a free-trade area or the adoption of an interim 
agreement necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a 
free-trade area.128 
A free trade area created by RTAs liberalizes trade 
among participating countries, but each participant 
maintains its own trade policy. For example, each 
participant sets a separate tariff schedule.129 A customs 
union (e.g., the European Union) liberalizes trade internally 
and also maintains common external trade policies such as a 
common tariff schedule.130 GATS Article V also authorizes 
“an agreement liberalizing trade in services between or 
among the parties to such an agreement” without a 
distinction between a free trade area and a customs union.131 
 
 125. Regional Trade Agreements: Committee, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regcom_e.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
X85L-CRRG].; World Trade Organization, Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements: Decision of 6 Feb. 1996, WTO Doc. WT/L/127 (1996) [hereinafter 
CRTA Decision]. 
 126. CRTA Decision, supra note 125. 
 127. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XXIV, para. 5. 
 128. Id. 
 129. LEE, supra note 2, at 179. 
 130. Id. 
 131. The distinction between a free trade area and a customs union is absent 
because trade in service does not involve tariffs. GATS, supra note 123, art. V 
para. 1. The Article provides, “This Agreement shall not prevent any of its 
Members from being a party to or entering into an agreement liberalizing trade 
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The Enabling Clause also authorizes Members to accord 
differential and more favorable treatment to developing 
countries with respect to preferential trade agreements 
concluded among developing countries.132 
2. “Substantially All Trade” 
The approval of RTAs is predicated on trade 
liberalization. Thus, Article XXIV sets a regulatory threshold 
for the approval of RTAs: for trade in goods, “substantially 
all trade” must be liberalized (i.e., elimination of duties and 
other restrictive regulations of commerce).133 For trade in 
services, there must be “substantial sectoral coverage,” and 
“substantially all discrimination” must be absent or 
eliminated in the covered sectors.134 Neither GATT Article 
XXIV nor GATS Article V requires “complete” trade 
liberalization for the approval of an RTA. In Turkey – 
Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products,135 
the Appellate Body noted the absence of an agreement on the 
interpretation of the term “substantially” in GATT Article 
XXIV.136 According to the Appellate Body, the term, 
“substantially all the trade” is not the same as “all the trade,” 
but considerably more than merely some of the trade.137 This 
requires a degree of qualitative assessment, and it will not 
be impossible to assign numerical guidelines such as a 
percentage of trade in terms of quantity or value. This 
provides Members negotiating RTAs with some discretion as 
to the extent of trade liberalization. 
 
in services between or among the parties to such an agreement . . . .” Id. 
 132. GATT 1979, supra note 124, para. 2(c). 
 133. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XXIV, para. 8. 
 134. GATS, supra note 123, art. V, para. 1. 
 135. Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and 
Clothing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Turkey 
- Textiles]. 
 136. Id. para. 48. 
 137. Id. 
2020] INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 445 
The Appellate Body also found that the term 
“substantially all the trade” has both qualitative and 
quantitative components.138 For example, the qualitative 
component suggests that RTAs that completely exclude a 
sector, such as agriculture, may not meet this requirement 
even if the quantity of trade in the excluded section may only 
be small compared to the all trade covered by the RTA.139 
According to the Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article XXIV, this requirement is not applied to RTAs 
between developing countries approved under the Enabling 
Clause.140 Thus, developing countries may pursue partial 
trade liberalization under this scheme. 
3. “Shall Not Be On the Whole Higher or More 
Restrictive Than Before” 
Article XXIV authorizes preferential trade 
arrangements under RTAs, but does not authorize exclusive 
trade blocks as seen in the 1930s.141 To prevent the formation 
of exclusive and discriminatory trade blocks, Article XXIV 
imposes a condition for the authorization of RTAs that “the 
duties and other regulations of commerce imposed . . . shall 
not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the 
 
 138. Id. para. 49. 
 139. Some RTAs excluded agricultural sector altogether. The WTO Secretariat 
issued a report in 1998 in which it “examined 69 FTAs and RTAs and stated that 
54 FTA agreements excluded some agricultural products and, in 2 FTA 
agreements, all of agricultural products were excluded.” Mitsuo Matsushita & 
Yong-Shik Lee, Proliferation of Free Trade Agreements and Some Systemic Issues 
- In Relation to the WTO Disciplines and Development Perspectives, 1 L. & DEV. 
REV. 23, 32 (2008) (citing Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Background 
Note by the Secretariat: Inventory of Non-Tariff Provisions in Regional Trade 
Agreements, WTO Doc. WT/REG/W/26 (May 5, 1998)). However, no examination 
report by the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements had been adopted due to 
a lack of consensus. ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 48, at 814. 
 140. GATT 1979, supra note 124, para. 2(c). 
 141. Such trade blocks provided trade preferences to the participants and 
raised trade barriers such as higher tariffs to the countries outside the blocks, 
worsening the global economic recession. LEE, supra note 2, at 180. 
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general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce 
. . . prior to the formation.”142 
Article XXIV does not define what constitutes “higher or 
more restrictive” duties and other regulations of commerce. 
The Understanding on Interpretations of Article XXIV of the 
GATT provides a guide in the case of tariffs: the weighted 
average rate should be used to determine the restrictiveness 
for the formation of a customs union.143 With respect to 
“other regulations of commerce,” it would be difficult to 
quantify and aggregate the regulations of commerce other 
than tariffs for the purpose of comparison. Thus, individual 
measures and regulations must be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis.144 It is debatable whether rules of origin are “other 
regulations of commerce” under Article XXIV.145 According 
to an argument, rules of origin are merely a means to decide 
the place of origin for a product to determine whether the 
product benefits from the preferential treatment of RTA, but 
not a trade restriction.146 An opposing viewpoint states that 
rules of origin operate as a de facto trade restriction even if 
they are not a trade restriction per se.147 In the UR, 
negotiators addressed this issue but did not reach an 
agreement.148  
 
 142. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XXIV, para 5. 
 143. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 219, para. 
2. 
 144. Turkey - Textiles, supra note 135, para. 54. According to Turkey – Textiles, 
an economic test should be performed to assess “trade restrictiveness.” Id. para. 
55. 
 145. Matsushita & Lee, supra note 139, at 33–34. 
 146. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Examination of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement: Note on the Meeting of 30 July 1996, WTO Doc. 
WT/REG4/M/2 (Feb. 21, 1997). 
 147. Matsushita & Lee, supra note 139, at 34. 
 148. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Background Note by the 
Secretariat: Systemic Issues Relating to “Other Regulations of Commerce”, WTO 
Doc. WT/REG/W/17, para. 9 (Oct. 31, 1997). 
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C. Implications for the Multilateral Trading System 
1. Fragmentation of Trade Disciplines 
RTAs created in accordance with the requirements of 
Article XXIV appear to be compatible with the objective of 
the MTS, because they do not raise trade barriers vis-à-vis 
non-RTA members. However, this does not remove the 
inherent exclusivity of trade preferences afforded by RTAs 
and still affects the trade of non-member countries adversely. 
For example, suppose that country A and country B are both 
subject to a tariff rate of 10 percent ad valorem on the export 
of their smartphones to country C under the MFN 
requirement. Suppose also that country A and country C 
form an RTA and liberalize trade between them, and country 
B is not a member of this RTA. After the conclusion of the 
RTA, which eliminates the 10 percent tariff on smartphones 
traded between country A and country C, the smartphone 
exporters of country B will be disadvantaged vis-à-vis the 
smartphone exporters from country A because their 
smartphone exports remain subject to the 10 percent tariff 
rate while no tariff is applied to the smartphones exported 
from country A as a result of the RTA. 
The disadvantage to the non-RTA members would be 
greater where RTAs also reduce non-tariff barriers (“NTBs”). 
NTBs, such as technical barriers to trade including product 
safety and sanitary requirements, have become more 
important, as multilateral trade negotiations have reduced 
tariffs have across the board.149 RTAs may reduce NTBs and 
enhance trade between the members by including terms to 
facilitate mutual cooperation of the technical standards and 
product safety requirements.150 RTAs may also remove or 
 
 149. Doha Declaration, supra note 79. 
 150. For example, Article 9 of the Free Trade Agreement between the United 
States of America and the Republic of Korea (US – Korea FTA) mandates such 
cooperation. See The United States – Korea Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-U.S., 
art. 9, Dec. 3, 2010, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/ 
korus-fta/final-text [https://perma.cc/H59G-FW7B]. 
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reduce trade remedy measures. Some RTAs, including the 
Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, abolish trade remedy 
measures such as anti-dumping measures. These 
preferences will benefit the exporters of the member 
countries in the exclusion of the non-members. The reduction 
or removal of trade barriers also applies to trade in services 
where the service sectors are covered by the RTA. RTAs set 
a preferred regulatory regime for the benefit of the member 
countries to the exclusion of the non-members, leading to 
fragmentation of trade disciplines. 
RTAs also set forth trade disciplines beyond NTBs. 
These disciplines include separate rules of origin,151 rules for 
international investment and intellectual property rights, 
and separate dispute settlement procedures. These RTAs 
rules may vary from the WTO provisions covering the 
relevant areas. As a result, their proliferations add 
complexity and confusion to the international trading 
system, which runs counter to the objective of the MTS.152 
Large RTAs create substantial overlaps in membership 
among Members. 153 As a result, multiple RTAs are applied 
to trade between identical members, causing a considerable 
regulatory burden on the customs at borders that have to 
 
 151. It is subject to argument that the rules of origin must be included among 
NTBs, in which case the discussion of NTBs should be placed in the preceding 
paragraph. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 152. The preamble of the WTO Agreement sets out the objectives. It states in 
relevant part, WTO Members are “desirous of contributing to these objectives by 
entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to 
the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce.” See WTO 
Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl.; see also Adrian Johnston & Michael Trebilcock, 
Fragmentation in International Trade Law: Insights from the Global Investment 
Regime, 12 WORLD TRADE REV. 621, 621 (2013). 
 153. Yong Shik Lee & Kwangkug Kim, Tripartite Free Trade Agreement among 
China, Korea, and Japan: A Step Towards Economic Integration in Northeast 
Asia?, in REGIONAL COOPERATION AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN ASIA 129 
(Jiaxiang Hu & M. Vanhullebusch eds., 2014). 
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process imports under the terms of multiple RTAs and those 
engaged in trade who have to understand those terms.154  
The complexity and confusion caused by the proliferation 
of RTAs add to the transaction cost, which is not conducive 
to the expansion of trade. The following figure illustrates 
how complex the fragmentations could be with multiple and 




Figure 2: RTAs in force and negotiation (2020)155 
 
 154. For this, Professor Matsushita argues the necessity of an “FTA network” 
in which FTA officials are frequently convened and discuss trade rules and other 
matters with the view to convergence. See Mitsuo Matsushita, View on Future 
Roles of The WTO: Should There be More Soft Law in The WTO, 17 J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 701, 701 (2014). 
 155. ASEAN Member States, ASS’N OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, 
https://asean.org/asean/asean-member-states/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2020) (listing 
the members of ASEAN); Yen Nee Lee, The world’s largest trade deal could be 
signed in 2020 – and the U.S. isn’t in it, CNBC (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.cnbc 
.com/2019/11/12/what-is-rcep-asia-pacific-trade-deal-slated-to-be-worlds-largest-
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2. Weakening of the MTS 
The long impasse of the Doha Round and the  inability of 
the WTO to conclude the Round have raised questions about 
the future of the WTO in at least two of its key areas: 
multilateral trade negotiations and setting trade rules. 156 
The significant difference in the Members’ positions on the 
key issues, such as agricultural subsidies, caused deadlock 
in the Doha negotiation process.157 In addition, the 
proliferation of RTAs affected negotiations in the Doha 
Round, because Members—by focusing on RTAs—diverted 
manpower and resources available for trade negotiations 
from the Doha Round to a number of RTAs.158 The RTA drive 
by major Members like the United States weakened the 
momentum for continuing the Doha Round. The proliferation 
of RTAs and increased Member participation in RTAs had 
adverse ramifications for the Doha Round and the MTS. 
The WTO may have become a victim of its own success. 
With its current membership of 164 countries, each with an 
equal vote, the institution may have reached a point where 
another successful “round” of negotiations has become very 
difficult due to the vast divergence in interests and priorities 
among many Members, each with vastly different economic 
 
fta.html (listing the members of RCEP and noting that India ultimately 
withdrew); James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, What Is the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/ 
backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp (listing the members of TPP 
and noting the U.S. ultimately withdrew); Chris Buckley & Terril Yue Jones, 
East Asian powes set to push trade pact talks, Reuters (May 12, 2012), https:// 
www.reuters.com/article/us-china-summit/east-asian-powers-set-to-push-trade-
pact-talks-idUSBRE84C00V20120513 (discussing the negotiations for the China-
Japan-South Korea Free Trade Agreement); USMCA, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/usmca (last visited Apr. 7, 2020) (listing the 
members of USMCA). 
 156. See discussion supra Section I.C. 
 157. See supra Section I.C. 
 158. By November 2015, the United States had been engaged in the 
negotiations of 12 RTAs, European Union in 31 RTAs, and Canada, Japan, and 
South Korea in 14, 17, and 14 RTAs, respectively, since 2001. See Regional Trade 
Agreements, supra note 113. 
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and trade capacities and political influence. Therefore, RTAs 
among a smaller group of countries sharing a set of common 
interests and priorities might be a more feasible means to 
develop trade relations.159 This explains the proliferation of 
RTAs during the Doha Round, which may well be a natural 
course of development. Nonetheless, RTAs do not replace the 
MTS,160 because RTAs, including mega RTAs such as EU, 
NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN, are not designed to 
accommodate the divergent interests and priorities of 
trading nations on a global scale. The Members addressed 
this point at the Nairobi Ministerial and reaffirmed “the 
need to ensure that Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) 
remain complementary to, not a substitute for, the 
multilateral trading system.”161 The proliferation of RTAs 
may have weakened the MTS, but most of the Members are 
not willing to discard the latter for RTAs.162 
  
 
 159. A study examined the impact of the Doha Round impasses on the 
proliferation of RTAs. See Stephen W. Hartman, The WTO, the Doha Round 
Impasse, PTAs, and FTAs/RTAs, 27 INT’L TRADE J. 411 (2013). 
 160. Director-General Roberto Azevêdo noted that bilateral and regional trade 
agreements have been “growing rapidly” but stressed that “there are many big 
issues which can only be tackled in an efficient manner in the multilateral 
context through the WTO.” See Regional initiatives cannot substitute for the 
multilateral trading system—Azevêdo, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 24, 2015), https 
://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra50_e.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2020). 
 161. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 19 December, 2015, 
WT/MIN(15)/DEC (2015). 
 162. Id. 
452 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
III. PROTECTIONISM FROM THE UNITED STATES 
A. Trade Protectionism under the Trump Administration 
This Part examines the third development in 
international trade law and practice post neoliberalism: the 
new trade protectionism from the United States under the 
Trump administration. The election of Donald Trump as the 
forty-fifth President of the United States marked a new era 
for U.S. trade policy. Shortly after taking office in 2017, he 
discarded his predecessor’s outward and engaging trade 
policy, including the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
Agreement, and made a swift policy change toward 
protectionism.163 He argued that his protectionist trade 
policy would bring back jobs and more income for working 
people in the United States. Trade protection through tariff 
hikes and other means would raise the prices of imported 
products and reduce their quantities, thereby improving the 
competitiveness of domestic products in the domestic 
market. This, in turn, would create more jobs and income for 
workers in the United States.164 
President Trump’s argument may appear plausible, but 
a deeper examination points to a very different outcome. 
Even if foreign and domestic businesses were to set up more 
manufacturing facilities in the United States to avoid high 
tariffs, such policy is unlikely to create more jobs and income 
for domestic workers. If manufacturers were compelled to 
produce in the United States, hiring American workers and 
paying higher wages than they would elsewhere, they would 
try to reduce employment by adopting labor-saving, 
automated production processes. This policy will not increase 
employment over time. Trade protection also instigates 
retaliation from abroad, as witnessed in the aftermath of the 
 
 163. John King & Jeremy Diamond, Trump team floats a 10% tariff on imports, 
CNN (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trump-
tariffs/ [ https://perma.cc/937E-A6GB]. 
 164. Id. 
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steel and aluminum tariffs.165 Such retaliation would reduce 
U.S. exports and cause job losses in the export industries. 
Therefore, the more likely policy outcome from trade 
protection is the rise of consumer prices on account of the 
higher tariffs on imported products, without corresponding 
increases in jobs and income. 166 
Notwithstanding the expected adverse policy outcome,167 
the new administration proceeded to implement the 
protectionist trade policy. The administration withdrew from 
the TPP Agreement that previous administrations strived to 
conclude for a decade, demanded re-negotiation of major 
trade agreements such as U.S. – Korea Free Trade 
Agreement and North American Free Trade Agreement, 
escalated a trade war with China, and adopted sweeping 
steel and aluminum tariffs on an unprecedented scale. The 
adoption of tariffs itself does not necessarily mean a change 
of trade policy toward protectionism; the previous 
administrations also adopted them through trade measures 
authorized by the WTO such as anti-dumping measures, 
countervailing measures, and safeguard measures. However, 
as discussed in the following two Sections, the trade 
measures adopted by the Trump administration are 
unprecedented to the point that the use of the term 
“protectionism” is warranted.  
The United States remains the world’s largest economy 
and trader, and its trade policy has a significant impact on 
the world economy and international trade. Thus, the policy 
shift toward protectionism has raised substantial concerns 
around the world168 and requires examination. The following 
Sections discuss two incidents that reflect the U.S. trade 
 
 165. See infra note 242. 
 166. Lee, supra note 24, at 230–31. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See, e.g., James Politi, A WTO warning for Donald Trump, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/5ff5538c-5a0d-11e9-9dde-7aed 
ca0a081a [https://perma.cc/WQF9-KS2U]. 
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policy. The first incident discussed is the recent trade war 
with China and its ramifications for the MTS, which began 
with the imposition of tariffs by the Trump administration. 
The second is the adoption of steel and aluminum tariffs by 
the United States for the alleged protection of its national 
security. 
B. Trade War with China 
On July 6, 2018 and August 23, 2018, the United States 
imposed 25 percent tariffs ad valorem on US $34 billion 
worth of imports from China (818 tariff subheadings) and 
again on US $16 billion (279 tariff subheadings), 
respectively.169 Prior to this imposition, the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) initiated an 
investigation into certain acts, policies, and practices of 
China related to technology transfer, intellectual property, 
and innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 
(Section 301).170 Section 301 authorizes the U.S. government 
to adopt trade measures if the acts, policies, and practices (of 
the foreign government) covered in the investigation are 
unreasonable or discriminatory and if they burden or restrict 
U.S. commerce.171 However, the WTO-consistency of Section 
301 action is questionable when it is taken without approval 
under the terms of WTO disciplines.172 
 
 169. Notice of Action and Request for Public Comment Concerning Proposed 
Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: China’s Acts, Policies, and 
Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 
83 Fed. Reg. 28,710 (June 20, 2018); Notice of Action Pursuant to Section 301: 
China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual 
Property, and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 40,823 (Aug. 16, 2018). 
 170. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2012). 
 171. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b). 
 172. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
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Under sections 301(b) and 304(a) of the Trade Act,173 the 
USTR made the following determinations: (i) China uses 
foreign ownership restrictions, such as joint venture 
requirements and foreign equity limitations, and various 
administrative review and licensing processes, to require or 
pressure technology transfer from U.S. companies; (ii) 
China’s regime of technology regulations forces U.S. 
companies seeking to license technologies to Chinese entities 
to do so on non-market based terms that favor Chinese 
recipients; (iii) China directs and unfairly facilitates the 
systematic investment in, and acquisition of, U.S. companies 
and assets by Chinese companies to obtain cutting-edge 
technologies and intellectual property and generate the 
transfer of technology to Chinese companies; (iv) China 
conducts and supports unauthorized intrusions into, and 
theft from, the computer networks of U.S. companies to 
access their sensitive commercial information and trade 
secrets.174 The President subsequently authorized the 
increased tariffs on this determination.175 
China’s practice in intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
and its industrial policy to support strategic industries, such 
as “Made in China 2025,” were direct causes of the U.S. 
action. The United States argued that it raised concerns on 
IPR issues repeatedly with China, but China was unwilling 
to offer meaningful modifications to its unfair practices.176 A 
 
 173. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(b), 2414(a). 
 174. Notice of Determination and Request for Public Comment Concerning 
Proposed Determination of Action Pursuant to Section 301: China’s Acts, Policies, 
and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and 
Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 14,906, 14,907 (Apr. 16, 2018). 
 175. On the grounds of (i), (iii), and (iv) in the determination, the United States 
chose to file a complaint with the WTO on the technology licensing regulations. 
See Request for Consultations by the United States, China – Certain Measures 
Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/1, 
IP/D/38 (Mar. 26, 2018). 
 176. Notice of Modification of Section 301 Action: China’s Acts, Policies, and 
Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 
83 Fed. Reg. 47,974, 47,975 (Sep. 21, 2018). 
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USTR report also states that trade analysts from several 
U.S. government agencies identified products that benefit 
from Chinese industrial policies, including Made in China 
2025, indicating that the U.S. measures were, at least in 
part, motivated to check against China’s industrial drive.177 
China defended its policies and objected to the U.S. tariffs, 
imposing approximately US $50 billion of retaliatory tariffs 
on imports from the United States.178 The United States 
responded and escalated the situation by imposing 
additional tariffs on the unprecedented US $200 billion 
worth of imports from China (5,745 full and partial tariff 
subheadings) at 10 percent ad valorem on September 24, 
2018, to be increased to 25 percent ad valorem on January 1, 
2019.179 Talks ensued between the two countries, leading to 
an agreed outcome that suspended tariff hikes.180 
The U.S. concerns about China’s IPR practice and its 
industrial policy have some legitimate grounds.181 Indeed, 
other WTO Members such as the EU have also raised 
concerns about China’s IPR practice.182 Nonetheless, the 
unilateral action by the United States under Section 301 is 
not consistent with WTO legal disciplines. Article 23.2 of the 




 177. Notice of Determination, 83 Fed. Reg. at 14,907. 
 178. Notice of Modification, 83 Fed. Reg. at 47,974. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, U.S.-
China, Jan. 15, 2020, https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6656794/UST 
R-Economic-and-Trade-Agreement-Between-the.pdf [https://perma.cc/QDS9-ED 
7M]. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Request for Consultations by the European Union, China - Certain 
Measures on the Transfer of Technology, WTO Doc. WT/DS549/1, G/L/1244, 
IP/D/39 (June 6, 2018). 
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2. Members shall: 
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has 
occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the 
attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been 
impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in 
accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, 
and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings 
contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB 
or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;  
. . . 
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the 
level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain 
DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before 
suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered 
agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to 
implement the recommendations and rulings within that 
reasonable period of time.183 
Article 23.2 prohibits unilateral trade measures in 
response to the perceived breach of WTO obligations. On a 
dispute concerning Section 301, the previous WTO dispute 
settlement panel also held that taking unilateral actions 
against other WTO member countries without first securing 
approval under the terms of the DSU would be inconsistent 
with the WTO disciplines. 184  The prior U.S. administrations 
have refrained from adopting unilateral trade measures 
under Section 301, and their revival on such an 
unprecedented scale signals the new U.S. trade 
protectionism. 
C. U.S. Steel and Aluminum Tariffs 
On March 23, 2018, the United States imposed 25 
percent and 10 percent increases in tariffs on all imported 
steel and iron products and all entries of aluminum products 
respectively, affecting $29 billion of steel trade and $17 
 
 183. DSU, supra note 172, art. 23, para. 2. 
 184. Panel Report, United States – Sections 301-310 of The Trade Act of 1974, 
WT/DS152/R (adopted Jan. 27, 2000). 
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billion of aluminum trade.185 The U.S. steel and aluminum 
tariffs are unprecedented in scale (in the amount of affected 
trade in the covered product categories) and unusual in the 
rationale—the protection of national security—which has 
rarely been invoked for trade measures. Prior to the 
implementation, the Department of Commerce investigated 
the national security effect of imports of steel and aluminum 
products under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962,186 and submitted final reports by January of 2018.187 
The reports underscored that steel and aluminum are 
essential to U.S. national security and that increased 
imports had weakened domestic industries producing these 
products.188 They concluded that the measures to reduce 
imports of these steel and aluminum products were 
necessary to strengthen domestic steel and aluminum 
industries that are essential to national security.189 
The unprecedented U.S. measures led to strong criticism 
from major steel and aluminum exporters around the world. 
Several Members, including the EU, China, Japan, Mexico, 
Canada, India, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, and Turkey, 
filed complaints with the WTO.190 These Members disagreed 
that the U.S. measures were necessary to protect national 
 
 185. Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 15, 2018); Proclamation 
No. 9704, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,619 (Mar. 15, 2018). 
 186. As amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1862. 
 187. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National 
Security: An Investigation Conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962, As Amended (2018) [hereinafter Steel Report]; U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, The Effect of Imports of Aluminum on the National Security: An 
Investigation Conducted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 
As Amended (2018) [hereinafter Aluminum Report]. 
 188. Steel Report, supra note 187, at 2; Aluminum Report, supra note 187, at 
2. 
 189. Steel Report, supra note 187, at 2; Aluminum Report, supra note 187, at 
2. 
 190. See Panels established to review US steel and aluminum tariffs, 
countermeasures on US imports, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www. 
wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/dsb_19nov18_e.htm [https://perma.cc/2LCF-E 
QEW]. 
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security concerns and concluded that the tariffs are a 
disguised trade protection inconsistent with WTO 
disciplines.191 There is history that supports this view. The 
United States has attempted to protect its declining domestic 
steel and aluminum industries for decades by adopting 
multiple trade measures, including a number of anti-
dumping measures.192 Thus, Members did not give credence 
to the national security argument that the United States 
raised to justify the steel and aluminum tariffs and 
considered it another pretext for the protection of domestic 
industries for a commercial purpose.193  
Regardless of the U.S. motive, GATT Article XXI 
authorizes the application of a measure that a Member 
“considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests.” 194 However, the scope of the national 
security interests defined by the U.S. government does not 
seem to be compatible with the requirement of the Article. 
While Article XXI does not define “essential security 
interests,” the Article limits the scope of these interests to 
those (i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials; (ii) 
relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements 
of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is 
carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying 
a military establishment; and (iii) taken in time of war or 
other emergency in international relations. 195  
Notwithstanding the limitations in Article XXI, the U.S. 
authorities defined the scope of the national security 
interests too broadly. The Department of Commerce 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. For the imposition of anti-dumping measures, see Anti-dumping Sectoral 
Distribution of Measures: By Reporting Member 01/01/1995 – 30/06/2019, WORLD 
TRADE ORG. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_Sectoral_Measures 
ByRepMem.pdf [https://perma.cc/T86B-RX5J]. 
 193. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the grounds for 
their complaints). 
 194. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XXI. 
 195. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XXI(b). 
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investigation reports identify the essential security interests 
as “national defense” and “critical infrastructure.”196 The 
measures required for national defense are likely justified 
under Article XXI. However, there is a question about the 
necessity to cover infrastructure needs under the essential 
national security, particularly when the needs are as broad 
and diverse as listed in the reports. The reports include all 
sorts of items, such as “chemical production, 
communications, dams, energy, food production, nuclear 
reactors, transportation systems, water, and waste water 
systems” (in the steel report),197 as well as “[e]lectric power 
transmission and distribution . . . [a]ircraft, automobiles, 
railroad freight cars, boats, ships, trains, trucks, trailers, 
wheels . . . [c]abinets, cans, foils, storage bins, storage tanks 
. . . [b]ridges, structural supports, conduit, piping, siding, 
doors, windows, wiring . . . [m]achinery, stampings, castings, 
forgings, product components, consumer goods, heating and 
cooling devices, and utility lighting fixtures” (in the 
aluminum report).198 
The reports do not justify the inclusion of such a broad 
range of items, including a variety of transportation devices 
and all components of construction, as relevant to the 
essential national security interests. If Members were 
allowed to include items of everyday use without particular 
security connotations (e.g., windows, cabinets, consumer 
goods) for the purpose of national security protection under 
Article XXI, they could use Article XXI to justify trade 
measures on every conceivable product, such as automobiles 
(another key product that has been investigated under 
Section 232), semiconductors, ships, and many others, citing 
their protection as somehow necessary to protect national 
security interests. If Members could invoke Article XXI for 
 
 196. Steel Report, supra note 187, at 23; Aluminum Report, supra note 187, at 
24, 36. 
 197. Steel Report, supra note 187, at 23–24. 
 198. Aluminum Report, supra note 187, at 24. 
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the protection of any product for its feeble connection to 
“essential security interests”—as defined by the Member—
the MTS will not be sustainable. The United States argued 
that the issues of national security are political matters not 
susceptible to review or capable of resolution by WTO 
dispute settlement,199 but a recent WTO panel held that the 
WTO has jurisdiction to review issues arising under Article 
XXI.200 The unprecedented steel and aluminum tariffs that 
are unlikely WTO-compliant represent new trade 




 199. See Communication from the United States, United States – Certain 
Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS548/13 (June 11, 
2018). 
 200. Panel Report, Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS512/R, paras. 7.53–7.58 (adopted Apr. 5, 2019) (asserting that the panel 
has jurisdiction to review Article XXI matters). 
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IV. CALL FOR REGULATORY REFORM 
The preceding Parts discussed the issues of international 
trade law post neoliberalism, including the development 
deficits, the proliferation of bilateralism and regionalism, 
and trade protectionism from the United States. Building on 
this discussion, this final Part proposes possible regulatory 
reforms to address the identified problems in the current 
trade disciplines. 
A. Remedying Development Deficits 
The UR, which adopted the neoliberal “one-size-fits-all” 
approach, produced the rules of international law that 
exhibit the development deficits.201 The current S&D 
treatment has proved to be inadequate to meet the 
development interests of developing countries,202 and some 
of the key provisions, such as the SCM Agreement, deprive 
developing countries of the ability to adopt effective 
development policies proven in successful development 
cases.203 The following discussion introduces proposals to 
remedy development deficits in the current disciplines. 
1. Development-Facilitating Tariff (DFT) 
The current WTO disciplines create difficulties for 
developing countries in need of a flexible tariff schedule to 
facilitate domestic industries. GATT Article II provides: 
(a) Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the 
other contracting parties treatment no less favourable than that 
provided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule 
annexed to this Agreement. 
(b) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to 
any contracting party, which are the products of territories of other 
contracting parties, shall, on their importation into the territory to 
which the Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or 
 
 201. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 202. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 203. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
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qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary 
customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein. 
Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges 
of any kind imposed on or in connection with the importation in 
excess of those imposed on the date of this Agreement or those 
directly and mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by 
legislation in force in the importing territory on that date.204 
The principle of binding concessions under Article II 
provides essential stability for the international trading 
system. However, it also restricts the ability of developing 
countries to adopt tariff measures above the maximum 
binding rates to promote domestic industries for 
development purposes. Notwithstanding the controversy 
regarding the effectiveness of the tariff protection as means 
of facilitating domestic industries and fostering economic 
development, provisions of the GATT such as Article XVIII 
approve measures for this purpose. 
Article XVIII, as discussed above,205 has certain limits: it 
requires developing countries to conduct negotiations with 
other interested Members and offer compensation in the 
form of trade concessions (e.g., lowering tariff rates).206 Such 
negotiations may take a considerable amount of time and 
cause delays in implementing necessary measures for 
development purposes.207 The required compensation may 
also burden the developing countries facing economic 
constraints, which would contradict their development 
interests. This multilateral scrutiny (i.e., negotiation and 
compensation requirement) embedded in Article XVIII 
diminishes its effectiveness as a tool for development; 
Members have never invoked Article XVIII since the 
beginning of the WTO, except to address balance of payment 
issues.208 This calls for regulatory adjustment to improve its 
 
 204. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. II, paras. 1(a)–(b). 
 205. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 206. GATT 1947, supra note 43, art. XVIII, para. 7. 
 207. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 208. ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 48, at 501 (citing a few cases of Article 
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use. 
To remedy this problem, the “Development-Facilitation 
Tariff” or “DFT” has been proposed.209 The DFT scheme sets 
the maximum additional tariff rate above the tariff binding 
under Article II for the purpose of assisting with the 
facilitation of domestic industries.210 Different maximum 
DFT rates are to be assigned to individual developing 
countries on a sliding scale in accordance with its level of 
economic development, measured by relevant economic 
indicators such as per-capita gross national income (GNI) 
figures.211 For example, suppose that the maximum DFT 
rate is set at 100 percent over the tariff binding, and the 
threshold for an eligible developing country to benefit from a 
DFT is US $8,000 per capita GNI. In that case, countries 
with a higher per-capita income than US $8,000 will not be 
eligible for a DFT. Country A with the per capita GNI of US 
$2,000, which is 25 percent of the threshold income, will be 
allowed to apply a DFT of 75 percent (100 percent x (100 
percent – 25 percent) = 75 percent). County B with the per 
capita GNI of US $6,000, which is 75 percent of the threshold 
income, will be allowed to apply a DFT of 25 percent (100 
percent x (100 percent – 75 percent) = 25 percent). The DFT 
scheme does not impose negotiation and compensation 
requirements on developing countries to improve its use. In 
lieu of these requirements, the DFT scheme introduces a 
series of procedural safeguards, including a public hearing, 
notice, a report setting forth rationales for the proposed 
increase in tariffs, and gradual liberalization and 
 
XVIII invocations). 
 209. Yong-Shik Lee, Facilitating Development in the World Trading System—
A Proposal for Development Facilitation Tariff and Development Facilitation 
Subsidy, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 935, 942–48 (2004); see also Yong-Shik Lee, WTO 
Disciplines and Economic Development: A Reform Proposal, 1 J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
293, 300–01 (2014); Yong-Shik Lee, The Long and Winding Road – Path Towards 
Facilitation of Development in the WTO: Reflections on the Doha Round and 
Beyond, 9 L. DEV. REV. 437, 450–51 (2016). 
 210. Lee, The Long and Winding Road, supra note 209, at 450. 
 211. Id. 
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elimination of the DFT after a set period of time, to reduce 
the possibility of abuse.212 
2. Development-Facilitating Subsidy (DFS) 
Government subsidies are an important tool for 
economic development, as recognized in the SCM 
Agreement.213 However, the SCM Agreement prohibits key 
trade-related subsidies, such as export subsidies and import-
substitution subsidies.214 Other subsidies that affect the 
trade of other Members adversely are also made “actionable,” 
i.e., subject to trade sanctions including countervailing 
measures under the SCM Agreement.215 As Dani Rodrik has 
explained, the current trade rules have made “a significant 
dent in the ability of developing countries to employ 
intelligently-designed industrial policies.”216 
The historical accounts demonstrate that subsidies have 
played an important role in the economic development of 
today’s developed countries.217 Thus, it stands to reason that 
developing countries should be accorded an option to adopt 
necessary subsidies without the risk of retaliation or rule 
breach. The concept of the sliding income scale, adopted in 
the DFT, can also be applied to authorize subsidies that are 
otherwise prohibited or actionable under the current SCM 
Agreement. The “Development-Facilitation Subsidy” (“DFS”) 
 
 212. See, e.g., SA, supra note 42, arts. 3, 7, 12. 
 213. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the SCM provision 
that recognizes the role). 
 214. SCM Agreement, supra note 9, art. 3. 
 215. Id. arts. 5–7. 
 216. Rodrik, supra note 19, at 34–35. 
 217. See CHANG, supra note 18, at 19–21. For instance, the United Kingdom 
provided extensive export subsidies to textile products in the eighteenth century. 
Id. at 21–22. The United States offered subsidies to railway companies in the 
nineteenth century and invested heavily in research and development of new 
technologies. Id. at 30–31. Germany also subsidized a number of industries, 
including textiles and metals. Id. at 33–34. Other developed countries today, 
including France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan, and the East Asian countries 
(NICs) all provided subsidies to promote their industries. Id. at 35–51. 
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can be introduced for the benefit of developing countries 
under certain per-capita income thresholds as in the DFT.218 
The DFS scheme allows developing countries to adopt the 
currently prohibited or actionable subsidies in accordance 
with their per-capita income status.219 For example, if the 
income threshold is US $8,000 and a developing country’s 
GNI per capita is US $6,000, which is 75 percent of the 
income threshold, the country is authorized to adopt a 
subsidy equivalent to 25 percent (100 percent – 75 percent) 
of the product value. 
The DFS cannot be used to support exports from 
developing countries that are already competitive in export 
industries whose share in the export market is above pre-set 
thresholds, since the objective of the DFS is to promote 
economic development through export facilitation. Further, 
developing countries that are already competitive in the 
export market of the concerned product would not need this 
subsidy for export facilitation. For example, if the threshold 
export market share is 10 percent, a developing country 
Member that takes up 15 percent of the export market will 
not be eligible to adopt the DFS in the corresponding product 
category. If a developing country’s export market share is 5 
percent, the country may adopt the DFS, according to the 
income scale, until it reaches the threshold market share but 
not after. The procedural requirements to prevent abuse, 
such as those listed for the DFT (e.g., a public hearing, notice, 
a report setting forth rationales for the proposed increase in 
tariffs, and gradual liberalization and elimination of the DFT 





 218. Lee, Facilitating Development, supra note 209, at 948–53; Lee, WTO 
Disciplines, supra note 209, at 301–02; Lee, The Long and Winding Road, supra 
note 209, at 451–52. 
 219. Lee, The Long and Winding Road, supra note 209, at 459. 
2020] INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 467 
3. Reforming Administered Protection 
The preceding discussion has identified anti-dumping 
measures and countervailing measures as adverse to the 
development interests of developing countries.220 The 
problems with countervailing measures will be reduced with 
the introduction of the DFS, as these measures will not be 
applicable against the DFS. However, the issues with anti-
dumping measures remain and need to be addressed. As 
discussed earlier, anti-dumping measures are applicable 
when imports are “dumped,” i.e., sold at prices below normal 
value.221 The normal value is determined by comparison to 
the home price or, where a proper comparison cannot be 
made due to the market situation or a low sales volume in 
the domestic market, to an export price in a third country.222 
The normal value can also be “constructed” with costs and 
reasonable profits.223 This flexibility accords the importing 
country a degree of latitude in anti-dumping determination.  
For example, there may be multiple home market prices 
to compare, and the determination of a reference home price 
will require a complex calculation of an adjusted average.224 
Where an investigator has to make a comparison to an export 
price in a third country, there may exist substantially 
different, multiple prices. Where an investigator has to 
“construct” a normal value, the outcome may vary depending 
on the specific methodology that the investigator chooses to 
adopt to calculate costs and “reasonable profit,” the measure 
of which can also vary.225 Considering the flexibility enjoyed 
by investigators, national investigating authorities virtually 
have a free hand to determine the existence of dumping and 
the dumping margin. The DDA included limited reform 
proposals, including clarifying and improving disciplines 
 
 220. See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 221. ADP Agreement, supra note 51, art. 1; see discussion supra Section I.A. 
 222. ADP Agreement, supra note 51, arts. 1–2. 
 223. Id. art. 2. 
 224. LEE, supra note 2, at 122. 
 225. Id. 
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under the ADP Agreement, 226 but these limited proposals 
are unlikely to remove the inherent arbitrariness from the 
anti-dumping regime. 
A deeper reform which restrains the imposition of anti-
dumping measures against imports from developing 
countries altogether is necessary. Major developing 
countries, such as China and India, are among the frequent 
users of anti-dumping measures. For the period from July 1, 
2017 to June 30, 2018, India, Argentina, China, and Brazil 
were reported to have adopted 43, 13, 12, and 10 definitive 
anti-dumping measures, respectively, while the United 
States, the EU, and Canada adopted 34, 6, and 2 measures, 
respectively.227 Increasing anti-dumping measures also 
target imports from developed countries as well as from 
developing countries. Anti-dumping measures might be a 
politically expedient tool for import control due to the 
regulatory flexibility, but most economists question the 
economic justification of anti-dumping measures.228 The 
GATS also does not have a provision for anti-dumping 
measures applied in the service trade. Given the weak 
economic justifications, consideration may also be given to 
completely removing anti-dumping measures from the MTS. 
Some RTAs, including Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 
have abolished anti-dumping measures. 
B. Bridging the Gap between the MTS and the RTAs 
Another area that requires regulatory reform is RTAs. 
The widespread derogation from the MFN principle with the 
proliferation of RTAs is one of the most important issues 
affecting the future of the MTS. The MFN tariff rates and 
the other conditions of trade agreed at the WTO negotiations 
no longer present the conditions of trade applicable to all 
 
 226. Doha Declaration, supra note 79. 
 227. World Trade Organization, Report (2018) of the Committee on Anti-
Dumping Practices, Annex C, WTO Doc. G/L/1270, G/ADP/25 (Oct. 29, 2018). 
 228. LEE, supra note 2, at 119–20. 
2020] INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 469 
WTO membership, but merely a baseline, and exclusive 
trade preferences are prevalent. The gaps between the MTS 
and the RTAs are widening with the proliferation of the 
latter and need to be bridged. A possible solution may include 
a gradual elimination of trade barriers within RTAs at more 
or less the same rate and on the same timetable as the 
lowering of barriers towards non-members.229 Under this 
solution (despite a significant free rider problem), the 
discriminatory effect of RTAs against non-members would be 
minimized. However, there is a coordination problem with 
this scenario: RTAs have their own timetables for trade 
liberalization and may not necessarily follow the suggested 
approach and set pace according to the reduction of trade 
barriers to non-member countries. 
Alternatively, a “sunset policy,” which prescribes a 
limitation on the duration of RTA preferences to a pre-set 
period, may present a solution.230 The present rules (Article 
XXIV) do not limit the life of an RTA or the trade preferences 
that it offers. Thus, RTAs run in perpetuity unless the 
participants terminate the agreement under its terms. One 
way to limit the deviation from the MFN principle would be 
to limit RTA preferences to a pre-determined time period and 
then require RTA members to extend trade preferences to 
the entire WTO membership on an MFN basis. RTA 
members will not have an incentive to comply with this 
without reciprocal compensation. Thus, the following 
collective action would be required: most likely there will be 
more RTAs that a member of an RTA has not joined than 
those it has. This means that the member will receive more 
trade preferences than it extends at any given time if trade 
 
 229. Renato Ruggiero, former general-director of the WTO, observed this 
possibility in certain regional trade areas such as APEC and MERCOSUR. Press 
Release, World Trade Organization, Regional Initiatives Should Aim for a Free 
Global Market, Says Ruggiero (Apr. 24, 1996), https://www.wto.org/english/ 
news_e/pres96_e/pr057_e.htm [https://perma.cc/A8RT-M82P]. 
 230. Yong Shik Lee, Reconciling RTAs with the WTO Multilateral Trading 
System: Case for a New Sunset Requirement on RTAs and Development 
Facilitation, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 625, 637 (2011). 
470 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 




 231. See id. A question has been raised as to how to reconcile wide and deep 
RTAs with much shallower ones. There is a possibility that Members with a few 
but major RTAs with their key export markets may not show much interest in 
the other RTAs, which may not offer attractive export markets to them. An 
alternative approach to the compulsory sunset policy would be to agree on the 
sunset policy on a voluntary, plurilateral basis. However, this alternative 
arrangement may raise an issue of “prisoner’s dilemma” discussed in the game 
theory: when an optimal outcome for everyone is expected only with everyone’s 
cooperation, one may still not cooperate because it does not know whether the 
other party will also cooperate. Where it is offered as voluntary, not as a 
compulsory measure, joining the voluntary arrangement will be an uncertain 
proposition for a WTO Member. Without knowing whether the other members 
will join the voluntary arrangement, a Member may not be willing to embark on 
the potentially costly process to persuade the domestic constituency to accept the 
MFN extension of their RTA preferences. The proposed compulsory policy may 
have a better political traction than in the past: a systematic concern about the 
multiplicity of rules as a result of the proliferation of RTAs and the resulting 
confusion and instability, which will raise cost in trade, may also encourage 
Members to look more favorably on the MFN extension of RTA preferences. Id. 
at 640 n.64. 
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The following table illustrates the point, applying the 
game theory. An RTA member or a “group” will lose if it 
extends trade preference unilaterally, but it will gain, along 
with every other RTA member, if all of them extend trade 
preferences to the entire membership by cooperation.232 
 The other RTA 
groups extend trade 
preferences. 
The other RTA 
groups do not extend 
trade preferences. 
RTA Group A 
extends trade 
preferences 
Outcome A: Both 
RTA Group A and 
the other RTA groups 
win 
Outcome B: RTA 
Group A loses and 
the other RTA 
groups win 
RTA Group A does 
not extend trade 
preferences 
Outcome C: RTA 
Group A wins and 
the other RTA groups 
lose 
Outcome D: Neither 
RTA Group or the 
other RTA groups 
win or lose. 
 
Table 1: Extension of Trade Preferences by RTA Group233 
 
Outcome D represents the status quo: no RTA group 
extends trade preferences to non-members, so no group wins 
or loses. Outcome A represents a result of collective action or 
cooperation: all RTA groups win. The optimal cooperation 
can be facilitated by the revised WTO rule that limits the life 
of exclusive RTA preferences and requires the extension of 
trade preferences to all WTO Members after a predetermined 
period of time.234 This extension of trade preferences would 
also increase the level of trade liberalization across the 
board.235 
 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 639. 
 234. Id. at 641. A period of fifteen years has been suggested. Fifteen years will 
be sufficiently long: few RTAs ever visage at the inception trade benefits to be 
gained from exclusive trade preferences beyond this time period. 
 235. However, consideration should be given to waiving the extension 
requirement for developing countries to meet their development interests. See id. 
at 644–47. 
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Finally, a determination needs to be made about the 
kinds of trade preference to be extended on the MFN basis. 
Tariffs will be straightforward, and the removal of tariffs 
among RTA members can be extended to non-members on 
the MFN basis after the pre-set time period. NTBs, however, 
are more complex and require further consideration. For 
example, mutual approval of professional qualifications and 
product standards among RTA members are likely to have 
been agreed after examination of the professional 
qualification requirements and the level of product 
standards of the members.236 As such, the MFN extension of 
these types of regulatory preferences may not be appropriate 
where the requirements and standards of the non-members 
may vary and may not be suitable for recognition for the 
members extending them. In contrast, removal of some other 
types of NTBs, which is not influenced by a standard or 
qualification, such as an abolishment of a cap on foreign 
ownership of a designated industry, may be appropriate for 
the MFN extension.237 A case-by-case examination would be 
necessary with respect to the NTBs to be liberalized on the 
MFN basis. 
C. Dealing with Trade Protectionism: A Few Suggestions 
Protectionist trade policies and measures undermine the 
trade interests of Members on the receiving end. An example 
is the recent steel and aluminum tariffs imposed by the 
United States.238 The Article XXI justification for these 
tariffs is questionable,239 and several Members have filed 
complaints with the WTO.240 However, the dispute 
settlement process may take years, and in the meantime the 
 
 236. Lee, supra note 230, at 642. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See discussion supra Section III.C. 
 239. See discussion supra Section III.C. 
 240. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the record of 
complaints). 
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exporting Members subject to the tariffs sustain injury. Even 
if the complaining Members ultimately win in the process, 
the WTO dispute settlement body (DSB) provides only a 
prospective remedy that requires the offending Member to 
bring their measures in conformity with their obligations 
under WTO disciplines, without compensating the exporters 
for the injury sustained from the measures.241 Thus, 
arguably, the dispute settlement process does not deter 
determined Members from adopting offending measures due 
to its inherent limitations. 
In response to protectionist tariffs from the U.S., several 
exporting Members have adopted retaliatory tariffs against 
imports from the United States.242 However, the consistency 
 
 241. See supra note 190 and accompanying text 
 242. See, e.g., European Union, Immediate Notification Under Article 12.5 of 
the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed 
Suspension of Concessions and Other Obligations Referred to in Paragraph 2 of 
Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards, WTO Doc. G/SG/N/12/EU/1 (May 18, 
2018); Russian Federation, Immediate Notification Under Article 12.5 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed 
Suspension of Concessions and Other Obligations Referred to in Paragraph 2 of 
Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards, WTO Doc. G/SG/N/12/RUS/2 (May 22, 
2018); China, Immediate Notification Under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of 
Concessions and Other Obligations Referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards, WTO Doc. G/SG/N/12/CHN/1 (May 22, 2018); Turkey, 
Immediate Notification Under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the 
Council for Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of Concessions and Other 
Obligations Referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards, WTO Doc. G/SG/N/12/TUR/6 (May 22, 2018); India, Immediate 
Notification Under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council 
for Trade in Goods of Proposed Suspension of Concessions and Other Obligations 
Referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards, WTO 
Doc. G/SG/N/12/IND/1/Rev.1 (June 14, 2018); Customs Notice 18-08: Surtaxes 
Imposed on Certain Products Originating in the United States, CAN. BORDER 
SERVS. AGENCY (June 29, 2018, Revised July 11, 2018), https://www.cbsa-
asfc.gc.ca/publications/cn-ad/cn18-08-eng.html [https://perma.cc/Q7CJ-G4Y8]. 
(Can.); Decreto por el que se modifica la Tarifa de la Ley de los Impuestos 
Generales de Importación y de Exportación, el Decreto por el que se establece la 
Tasa Aplicable durante 2003, del Impuesto General de Importación, para las 
mercancías originarias de América del Norte y el Decreto por el que se establecen 
diversos Programas de Promoción Sectorial, Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DOF] 05-06-2018 (Mex.). 
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of these retaliatory tariffs with WTO disciplines is also 
questionable.243 Besides the WTO-compliance issue, this 
type of retaliatory response may also escalate into a trade 
war, such as the recent one between the United States and 
China.244 In addition to the risk of causing a trade war, 
immediate retaliation may not offer a full remedy to the 
injured export industries. The revenue collected from the 
retaliatory measures (i.e., increased tariffs) could be 
transferred to injured industries and compensate them for 
the loss of the export revenue. However, the compensation 
cannot generate alternative export markets for the affected 
industries or fully cover some of the loss caused by the 
reduction in export, such as reduction in production and loss 
of employment, which has long-term ramifications. The 
retaliatory measures may benefit domestic producers 
competing with the covered imports but will raise prices of 
the imports for domestic consumers. In addition, the outcome 
of the initial import restraints and retaliation would be 
higher prices and reduced trade volumes, causing a net 
economic loss.245 
The delays and limitations in remedy (i.e., only 
prospective remedy), as well as the adverse economic impact 
of retaliation, demand a different approach. The delays in the 
dispute settlement process require an improvement by 
expediting the process and reducing the current case 
backlog. To make this improvement, resources available to 
the WTO, including the number of full-time lawyers to assist 
the DSB, need to be expanded. Additional measures, such as 
the appointment of full-time panelists, introduction of 
intensive sessions for the panel and the Appellate Body 
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proceedings, and the expansion of the Appellate Body 
membership, would be helpful to expedite the process. 
However, it not clear whether the Members would be willing 
to agree on the expansion of the resources. The failure to 
conclude the Doha Round has weakened institutional 
confidence in the WTO, and some Members are known to 
have limited trust in the WTO dispute settlement process.246  
Consideration should also be given to fix the prospective 
remedy currently offered by the DSB. Remedies may include 
the requirement of payment, including the return of payment 
equivalent to the revenue generated by the increased tariffs 
found inconsistent with WTO rules. The calculation of 
payment will be more complex when a quota is involved. As 
in the case of retaliation, compensation in the form of 
payment may not be a full remedy for the affected exporting 
industry, because it may not cover the loss of export markets 
and employment. Despite these limits, the payment 
requirement will discourage Members from adopting 
measures inconsistent with WTO disciplines. Additional 
measures, such as injunctive relief, which requires the 
Member applying the disputed measure to suspend its 
application in whole or in part pending the final outcome of 
the dispute settlement process, could also be helpful to 
prevent the escalation of the situation. The conditions 
defining a threshold for such suspension, such as the number 
of complainants and the size of trade to be affected by the 
measure, will have to be determined. 
  
 
 246. See Tom Miles, Diplomats search for way to save trade system after U.S. 
vetoes judges, REUTERS WORLD NEWS (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-usa-trade-wto/diplomats-search-for-way-to-save-trade-system-after-u-
s-vetoes-judges-idUSKBN1DR2PR [https://perma.cc/E24K-XA3C]. 
476 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This Article has examined developments in international 
trade law and practice post neoliberalism. The failure to 
conclude the Doha Round undermined institutional 
confidence and credibility of the WTO, but most Members 
agree that there is no replacement for the MTS under the 
auspices of the WTO.247 The development deficits in WTO 
disciplines, as a result of the neoliberal approaches (“one-
size-fits-all”) adopted in the rule making process of the UR, 
caused subsequent challenges from developing countries.248 
Developing countries, through various coalitions and 
alliances, prevented the expansion of the neoliberal agenda 
(“the Singapore issues”) after the UR and renewed focus on 
development through the DDA. The Doha Round did not 
accomplish fundamental regulatory reform, such as the 
reform of the subsidies regime as introduced in this Article. 
However, even the limited reform agenda faced objections 
from developed countries, demonstrating the substantial 
gaps in positions on development issues between developed 
and developing countries. 
While the Doha Round stagnated, developed country 
Members that could not advance their agenda through 
multilateral negotiations turned to RTAs. The proliferation 
of RTAs might be viewed as a natural development in 
consideration of the size of the WTO membership (164 
countries) and the vast differences among Members in their 
capacities, interests, and priorities related to trade. 
However, the proliferation of RTAs can lead to a 
fragmentation of the trade disciplines and the 
destabilization of the MTS.249 RTAs may increase the space 
of free trade, but their exclusive nature erodes the MFN 
principle, which is the core base of the MTS. Further, RTAs 
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burden trading nations with dissimilar rules under multiple 
RTAs, whose terms may be different from one another and 
also from WTO rules. This complexity is not conducive to the 
expansion of international trade. Developing countries may, 
once again, be on the receiving end in RTA negotiations with 
more powerful developed countries where they cannot form 
effective coalitions and alliances. 
Trade protectionism is another concerning development. 
The recent U.S. trade policy—a shift toward protectionism 
and unprecedented protective trade measures argued to be 
necessary to safeguard U.S. trade interests and preserve 
policy autonomy250—is an ironic response, considering that 
the United States was the main architect of the post war 
international trading system, including the GATT and the 
WTO. It is a testament to the change that has taken place 
since the 1990s, suggesting that the time for neoliberalism 
has passed. Indeed, the neoliberalism embedded in WTO 
disciplines does not even work for the most powerful economy 
and the largest trader, regardless of the legitimacy of the 
trade policy and trade measures adopted by the Trump 
administration. The tariff hikes under the Trump 
administration, both against China and the rest of the world 
(the steel and aluminum tariffs) are unprecedented in scale. 
The rationale for the tariffs—the protection of national 
security—is similarly unprecedented. National security has 
never been invoked to justify such massive trade measures 
on a global scale, and its proliferation would endanger the 
stability of the MTS. At the time of writing, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce has completed another 
investigation report concluding that trade measures are also 
necessary to protect domestic automobile industries for 
national security.251 
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This Article has also examined possible regulatory 
reforms to address the issues raised in the proceeding 
discussion: the development deficits, the gaps in the trade 
disciplines caused by the proliferation of RTAs, and the 
problems caused by trade protectionism and retaliations.252 
As to the development deficits, this Article has introduced 
regulatory reforms that will instill flexibility in the tariff 
schedules, such as the Development-Facilitating Tariff or 
“DFT.” This Article has also suggested reforms that will 
restore developing countries’ ability to adopt trade-related 
subsidies for economic development, such as the 
Development-Facilitating Subsidy or “DFS.” Further, it has 
discussed the revision of anti-dumping measures, beyond the 
limited reform that has been proposed in the Doha Round.253 
On RTAs, the derogation from the MFN principle is 
inherently incompatible with the MTS, weakening the latter. 
This Article has examined regulatory reforms, such as the 
proposed sunset policy, to close the gaps between the MTS 
and RTAs.254 Lastly, the recent trade protectionism and the 
unprecedented trade measures raise substantial concern for 
the future of the MTS. Retaliatory responses are not a 
sustainable solution, and consideration should be given to 
more feasible ones, which include measures to expedite the 
WTO dispute settlement process, augment the current 
prospective remedies with payment requirements, and 
provide injunctive relief. The suggested reforms will 
reinforce the MTS in the changing international 
socioeconomic environment post neoliberalism. 
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